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In reality the emphasis has been on more 
effective law rather than more law, and 
in this context much more attention has 
been paid to the role of regulators. This 
reflects the fact that we know more now 
about the critical role of the regulator in 
delivering regulatory outcomes, although 
not through the traditional approach 
of administering command and control 
regulatory regimes based on prescriptive 
rules and heavy-handed enforcement, but 
rather something quite different. 
We also have a better appreciation 
of the attributes of effective regulation, 
such as the importance of regulatory 
certainty, and the reality that there is not 
one regulatory approach which fits all 
businesses. For example, larger and more 
sophisticated businesses may be able to 
work with principles-based regulation in 
a way that small businesses cannot.1 
Finally, we have a better appreciation of 
what is required to ensure that regulation 
is effective in a New Zealand context. 
For example, New Zealand has relatively 
limited competition in many markets 
It is tempting to characterise changes in the regulatory 
landscape in response to regulatory failure, such as leaky 
buildings, failed finance companies, and the Pike River 
disaster, as a reversion to state control and the triumph of 
prescription over principles and performance requirements. 
If judged by the quantum of law as measured by the increase 
in the number of clauses in relevant statutes, or the size 
of regulators’ budgets, one might be excused for drawing 
this conclusion. For example, the Building Act 1991 had 93 
clauses, but its successor, the Building Act 2004, has some 
451. The building regulator’s budget was $3.5 million in 
2002, increasing to $16 million in 2011, with the security 
regulator’s budget increasing from a similar base and by a 
similar amount over the same period. 
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and lack of depth or capability among 
expert professions and advisers. This 
increases the risks for us that regulatory 
systems which rely for their effectiveness 
on vigorous competitive disciplines, well-
developed markets for information and 
readily available specialised expertise may 
not be effective, or as effective, in New 
Zealand. 
Using building controls, financial 
markets regulation and occupational 
health and safety as examples, we will 
present here our analysis of the changes to 
the regulatory landscape, and in particular 
the role of regulators as a particular facet 
of regulatory design. The change process 
is ongoing. In the workplace health and 
safety area we will draw on the 2013 
report of the Independent Taskforce on 
Workplace Health and Safety,2 and in the 
financial markets area we will draw on 
both the Financial Markets Authority Act 
2011 and the Financial Markets Conduct 
Act 2013. 
Drivers of change 
The impetus for recent changes to the 
regulatory landscape has been significant 
adverse events that have been seen as 
failures of existing law. In this respect law 
reform is following historical patterns. 
For example, the building control regime 
introduced in 1991 was in response to 
perceptions of regulatory failure, although 
in this case the overriding concern was 
with law that was excessively burdensome 
rather than ineffective (Mumford, 2011). 
Successive financial markets law reform 
in New Zealand over the past 30 years 
has typically been a reaction to financial 
failures and concerns that these have 
resulted from weak law (see, for example, 
Fitzsimons (1994) on the impetus for 
securities law reform in the 1970s and 
1980s). 
The impetus for change is not, 
however, the same as the drivers of the 
changes we have seen in these statutes or 
recommended by the workplace health 
and safety taskforce. Regulatory failure 
can explain why there was change, but not 
what changed. The latter can generally be 
explained by reference to four drivers: 
(1) best practice legislative design and 
implementation; (2) modernisation; 
(3) shifts in the fundamental regulatory 
approach; and (4) either shifts in societal 
expectations or a better appreciation 
of those expectations. For example, the 
workplace health and safety taskforce is 
proposing to broaden the definition of 
primary duty holders in relation to duties 
to deliver health and safety outcomes. 
This is an example of modernisation of 
the law, as it reflects modern workplace 
practices, rather than a fundamental 
shift in regulatory approach. An 
example of a fundamental shift is the 
change of approach from prescriptive 
to performance-based regulation in a 
number of regimes, including building 
and occupational health and safety, in the 
1990s. 
Conceptualising the regulator 
Arguably, the one fundamental shift in 
regulatory approach common to building 
and securities markets and envisaged by 
the workplace health and safety taskforce 
is in the role of the regulator. Experience, 
common sense and theory have combined 
to build a picture of a new sort of regulator, 
better equipped to deliver regulatory 
outcomes envisaged by Parliament in a 
complex and dynamic environment. 
The theoretical foundations can be 
found in the writings of academics such 
as Ayres and Braithwaite’s Responsive 
Regulation (1992) and Baldwin and 
Black’s ‘Really responsive regulation’ 
(2008), both cited in the workplace 
health and safety taskforce report. The 
Capital Market Development Taskforce 
drew on Bhattacharya and Daouk (2009), 
who argued that regulation that is not 
enforced can be worse than having no 
regulation at all to support the case for 
a proactive regulator that educated and 
informed, but also provided a ‘visible 
deterrent’ which enhanced its overall 
credibility and hence effectiveness. 
Current thinking locates the regulator 
at the pivot of a complex system that 
requires many actors in many different 
roles to all play their part. The regulator 
needs to be clear about the objectives of 
the law and its specific role, relative to 
others, in achieving them. The regulator 
must also develop a deep understanding 
of the system and the opportunities 
and challenges it offers with respect to 
legal compliance; have available to it 
and effectively deploy a range of tools 
for achieving compliance in a range of 
situations; and be willing and able to 
evolve its approach in response to new 
information on how the law is working in 
practice and what future demands will be 
placed on it. It must also carry out its role 
transparently and with regard to the costs 
as well as benefits of regulatory action. 
Modern statutes convey much more 
information to regulators than in the past 
about their role and how they should 
perform it. In effect, regulators have always 
been able to exercise discretion. Modern 
statutes still provide for discretion, but 
are more informative in terms of how 
that discretion should be exercised. 
Discretion continues to be important, 
as the modern regulator needs to choose 
the most appropriate type of intervention 
(e.g. informing versus sanctioning) given 
the particular circumstances and based 
on evidence. This is not necessarily clear 
at the time a new regulatory regime is put 
in place or a new regulator is established. 
This is not just an issue of flexibility 
for the regulator. If implemented well, 
it should lead to the most effective and 
lowest (social) cost solution for the 
regulated. 
We illustrate this conceptualisation 
of the modern regulator and how it is 
being reflected in law with reference 
to the Building Act 2004, Financial 
Modern statutes convey much more information 
to regulators than in the past about their role and 
how they should perform it. In effect, regulators 
have always been able to exercise discretion.
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Markets Authority Act 2011, Financial 
Markets Conduct Act 2013, and the 
recommendations of the workplace health 
and safety taskforce, under headings that 
mirror what is found in statute: purpose 
and principles, functions and duties, and 
powers. 
Purpose and principles 
The purpose statements in statutes are an 
expression of the outcomes expected by 
Parliament, and principles are typically 
matters that must be taken into account 
by those who have a statutory obligation 
in relation to producing those outcomes.3 
Both the Building Act 2004 and Financial 
Markets Conduct Act 2013 illustrate 
how societal expectations, resulting 
from or clarified through a crisis, have 
been transmitted through new purpose 
statements, and the workplace health and 
safety taskforce has recommended a new 
purpose for a new workplace health and 
safety act that is similarly illustrative. 
The purpose of the Building Act 2004 
extended the scope of the building control 
regime from a primary focus on safe and 
healthy buildings to include, among other 
things, a broader focus on the well-being 
of the people who use them. This reflected 
an appreciation, born out of the dramatic 
effects on people’s lives of leaking and 
rotting buildings, that dwellings, in 
particular, contributed to the social fabric 
of society and the concept of well-being 
captured important building attributes 
that safety and health missed. 
In proposing that the current purpose 
of the Health and Safety in Employment 
Act 1992 of promoting the prevention 
of harm be replaced with the Australian 
model law – national model workplace 
health and safety law – formulation 
which is to secure the health and safety of 
workers and workplaces, the workplace 
health and safety taskforce has signalled 
a more proactive regulatory approach. 
Coupled with the principle in the model 
law that ‘workers and other persons should 
be given the highest level of protection 
against harm … as is reasonably 
practicable’, also recommended by the 
workplace health and safety taskforce, 
this signals a high bar in terms of the 
levels of health and safety sought. 
The Securities Act 1978 did not have 
a purpose statement and the Securities 
Commission developed its own, which, 
in 2007, was to ‘strengthen investor 
confidence and foster capital investment 
in New Zealand by promoting the 
efficiency, integrity and cost-effective 
regulation of our securities markets’.4 
The Financial Markets Conduct Act does 
contain a purpose statement, which is ‘to 
promote and facilitate the development 
of fair, efficient, transparent financial 
markets and to promote the confident 
and informed participation of businesses, 
investors, and consumers in the financial 
markets’.
 In addition to what is signalled 
through the statutory purpose, these 
recent statutes (and recommendations in 
relation to workplace health and safety) 
also aim to provide more comprehensive 
and explicit guidance on what needs to 
be taken into account by the regulator in 
carrying out its role. This is done though 
the inclusion or extension of statutory 
principles. The building case illustrates 
this most graphically. The Building Act 
1991 had six principles. Its successor, 
the Building Act 2004, has 17 principles, 
ranging from facilitating the preservation 
of buildings of significant cultural, 
historical or heritage value to allowing 
for innovation. This construct is shared 
with the Financial Markets Conduct 
Act 2013 (there were no principles in 
the Securities Act 1978 and there are 
four ‘additional purposes’ in the act of 
2013), and recommendations of the 
workplace health and safety taskforce (an 
increase from eight in the Health and 
Safety in Employment Act 1992 to 11 
recommended by the taskforce). 
Two key objectives underpin this 
preference for more principles: 
•	 to	clarify	what	the	regulator	is	
expected to take into account in 
undertaking what might be described 
as its core regulatory functions: i.e. 
those associated with achieving the 
primary purposes of the statute; 
•	 to	codify	other	policy	objectives	
that the regulator should contribute 
to when carrying out its functions: 
e.g. the innovation principle in the 
Building Act 2004 and the additional 
purpose of ‘promote innovation and 
flexibility in the financial markets’ in 
the Financial Markets Conduct Act 
2013. 
Functions and duties 
The shift in the direction of greater 
specification in statute of matters that 
have a bearing on the role of the regulator 
is also evident in relation to functions and 
duties. The workplace health and safety 
and financial markets areas are exceptional 
in so far as the primary legislation did not 
specify any general functions or duties 
for the regulator. This reflects the age of 
the statutes, and best practice today is 
that functions would be specified. What 
is notable is that the workplace health 
and safety taskforce recommended 17 
general functions of the regulator and 
three general duties,5 and the Financial 
Markets Authority Act 2011 specifies a 
main objective for the Financial Markets 
Authority (FMA) and six functions (with 
an additional four sub-clauses that spell 
out in more detail what is expected of the 
regulator). 
The Building Act 2004 demonstrates 
a similar emphasis, specifying 19 roles 
of the chief executive and around four 
general duties, compared with nine 
functions given to the Building Industry 
Authority in the Building Act 1991 and 
no general duties. 
This again is evidence of an intention 
to be much more specific in statute in 
The shift in the direction of greater specification in 
statute of matters that have a bearing on the role of 
the regulator is also evident in relation to functions 
and duties. 
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terms of what is expected of the law and 
the role of the regulator in delivering these 
outcomes. This not only clarifies and 
strengthens the mandate of the regulator, 
and incidentally make it easier to monitor 
its performance, but also improves the 
understanding of all those involved in 
the regulatory system of what they can 
reasonably expect from the regulator. 
The breadth of these functions and 
duties also illustrate the concept of a 
responsive regulator described earlier. For 
example: 
•	 The	modern	regulator	should develop 
a deep understanding of the system 
and the opportunities and challenges it 
offers with respect to legal compliance. 
This is illustrated by the difficulties 
New Zealand has experienced in 
building, and that the entire world 
has experienced in financial markets, 
where regulators did not have a 
sufficiently strong understanding of 
the risks being taken; although, to 
be fair to them, neither did most of 
the participants, commentators and 
researchers. This new emphasis on 
understanding the system can be seen 
in the duty of the chief executive 
responsible for administering the 
Building Act to monitor current and 
emerging trends in building design, 
building technologies, and other 
factors that may affect the building 
code and compliance documents, and 
report annually to the minister. It can 
also be seen in the recommendation 
of the workplace health and safety 
taskforce 6 that the new workplace 
health and safety regulator has a 
function of monitoring and reporting 
on how the health and safety system 
is working in practice, and making 
recommendations for improvement. 
•	 The	modern	regulator	should 
have available to it and effectively 
deploy a range of tools for achieving 
compliance in a range of situations. 
This is reflected in the functions 
provided for (in the building area) 
or recommended (in the workplace 
health and safety area), which 
range from developing technical 
regulations and guidance and 
providing authoritative advice, to 
promoting and supporting education 
and training and access to competent 
advice, to traditional enforcement 
action. We can also see it in the 
additional powers given to regulators, 
which will be discussed below. 
•	 The	modern	regulator	must also carry 
out its role transparently and with 
regard to the costs as well as benefits 
of regulatory action. This is reflected 
in the procedural requirements in 
the Building Act 2004 in relation to 
compliance documents, warnings 
and bans, whereby the chief executive 
must seek to identify all reasonably 
practicable options for achieving the 
objective of the document, warning 
or ban, and assess the benefits and 
costs of each option and the extent 
to which the objective would be 
promoted or achieved by each option, 
and must consult on this analysis. It 
is also reflected in recommendations 
of the workplace health and safety 
taskforce that the regulator should 
publish its compliance strategy 
to make clear how it will strike 
the balance between information/
guidance and enforcement, and how 
it will achieve certainty without 
being over-prescriptive or overly 
complicated. The FMA has a function 
of issuing guidance and publishes its 
enforcement policy. These documents 
are guided by the purposes of the 
statute, including the additional 
purposes of promoting innovation 
and avoiding unnecessary compliance 
costs. 
Powers 
We have noted that the modern regulator 
should have available to it and effectively 
deploy a range of tools for achieving 
compliance in a range of situations. This 
principle is reflected in the increase in the 
number and type of powers given to the 
regulator. 
The building control regime, involving 
multi-level governance, has some 
distinctive features as the nature of the 
new powers given to the regulator reflects 
what we now know about the challenges 
of multi-level governance. The Building 
Industry Authority had a limited set of 
powers, reflecting a view at the time that 
the substantive building regulators were 
the territorial authorities. The Building 
Act 2004 represented a significant shift in 
approach, with the establishment of the 
Department of Building and Housing (now 
the Ministry of Business, Innovation and 
Employment) as the central coordinating 
and control authority (Mumford, 2011). 
There was a commensurate increase in 
the range of powers given to the regulator, 
including an ability to initiate the process 
of determining whether an alternative 
solution meets the requirements of 
the Building Code,7 and an ability to 
issue warnings and bans and mandate 
compliance documents. 
In addition, the regulator is able 
to take enforcement action (including 
taking proceedings for offences under 
this act) if the chief executive considers 
that it is desirable to do so to establish or 
clarify any matter of principle relating to 
building or the interpretation of the act, 
or in cases where one or more territorial 
authorities are unwilling or unable to 
take enforcement action. 
Work undertaken by Treasury suggests that the 
combined effect of regulatory failure and the 
desire by both regulated entities and regulators 
for greater regulatory certainty is a shift in the 
direction of more prescriptive or measurable 
regulatory standards.
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Workplace health and safety and 
financial markets for the most part 
involve a single central regulator, and 
the increase and configuration of powers 
either in place or proposed have the 
effect of increasing the range of tools 
in the regulator’s tool box, drawing on 
New Zealand and overseas experience 
of what seems to work best in certain 
situations. For example, the workplace 
health and safety taskforce recommended 
that the new regulator have, among other 
things, the ability to accept enforceable 
undertakings, and the FMA already has 
such powers. This is consistent with recent 
Australian research on the merits of this 
approach to compliance (Johnstone and 
King, 2009). 
Conclusion 
Work undertaken by Treasury suggests that 
the combined effect of regulatory failure 
and the desire by both regulated entities 
and regulators for greater regulatory 
certainty is a shift in the direction of more 
prescriptive or measurable regulatory 
standards. For the most part this can be 
seen as a desirable part of the learning 
process. In effect we know more about 
how performance- and principles-based 
regulation works in practice, and this is 
being reflected back into the design and 
implementation of regulatory regimes. 
In relation to regulatory design, some 
of the biggest shifts are in relation to 
how statute law mandates, guides, directs 
and empowers the regulator. We observe 
much more specific and comprehensive 
statutory provisions in the areas of 
purpose and principles, functions and 
duties, and powers. Underlying this 
approach is the philosophy that visible 
and proactive regulators can be critical 
to the effective operation of some 
regulatory regimes, and certainly those 
that have been the focus of this article. 
This does not, however, signal a heavy 
regulatory hand. Rather, what we see in 
statute, and in the recommendations of 
the workplace health and safety taskforce, 
is the concept of a responsive, or ‘really 
responsive’, regulator that understands 
the regulatory environment and applies 
a range of fit-for-purpose strategies for 
achieving desirable regulatory outcomes 
efficiently and effectively. 
1 This of course requires a sufficiently sophisticated 
understanding of the industries and markets regulators 
regulate given the information disadvantages they face as 
institutions. There is a high premium on developing effective 
working relationships with the sectors being regulated.
2 The government has largely accepted this taskforce’s 
recommendations. Worksafe New Zealand has been 
established through the Workplace New Zealand Act 2013 
and a new Health and Safety Reform Bill is now in progress. 
See www.mbie.nz/what-we-do/workplace-health-and-safety-
reform.
3 While the term ‘principles’ has been used, this is the 
construct in the Building Act 2004. The Financial Markets 
Conduct Bill uses ‘Main Purposes’ and ‘Additional Purposes’, 
and the Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 has a 
single ‘Object of Act’ clause, with a statement of ‘Object’ and 
a list of ways in which the Object will be achieved.
4 Securities Commission of New Zealand annual report, 2007.
5 Worksafe has a main objective and 13 general functions 
under the Worksafe Act 2013.
6 This recommendation is reflected in the functions of 
Worksafe. 
7 See section 181 of the Building Act 2004.
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